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Abstract
Human categorization is one of the most important and successful targets of cognitive mod-
eling in psychology, yet decades of development and assessment of competing models have
been contingent on small sets of simple, artificial experimental stimuli. Here we extend this
modeling paradigm to the domain of natural images, revealing the crucial role that stim-
ulus representation plays in categorization and its implications for conclusions about how
people form categories. Applying psychological models of categorization to natural images
required two significant advances. First, we conducted the first large-scale experimental
study of human categorization, involving over 500,000 human categorization judgments of
10,000 natural images from ten non-overlapping object categories. Second, we addressed
the traditional bottleneck of representing high-dimensional images in cognitive models by
exploring the best of current supervised and unsupervised deep and shallow machine learn-
ing methods. We find that selecting sufficiently expressive, data-driven representations is
crucial to capturing human categorization, and using these representations allows simple
models that represent categories with abstract prototypes to outperform the more complex
memory-based exemplar accounts of categorization that have dominated in studies using less
naturalistic stimuli.
Introduction
The problem of categorization—how an intelligent agent should group stimuli into discrete concepts—
is an intriguing and valuable target for psychological research: it extends many influential themes
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in Western classical thought1, has clear interpretations at multiple levels of analysis2, and is fun-
damental to understanding human minds and advancing artificial ones3. Previous categorization
research has had many successes—in particular, the development of high-precision statistical mod-
els of human behavior4, 5. A central and enduring debate in this literature is whether human cat-
egorization is best accounted for by assuming people form abstract summary representations for
categories (“prototype” models)6, 7 or store examples of category members in memory (“exemplar”
models)8, 9. Laboratory findings have largely favored exemplar models, which can produce more
complex boundaries between categories—people can learn such boundaries when given sufficient
training4, 8, 9.
While this work has been insightful and theoretically productive, we know little about how it
relates to the complex visual world it was meant to describe: it derives almost exclusively from lab-
oratory experiments using highly-controlled and simplified perceptual stimuli, represented math-
ematically by hand-coded descriptions of obvious features or multidimensional-scaling (MDS)
solutions of similarity judgments8, 10–12. Human categorization abilities, by contrast, emerge from
contact with the natural world, and the problems it poses. As the category divisions that result
may be best understood in this context, a central challenge is to extend existing theory to account
for behavior over such domains. Recent work has begun to take up this challenge13; however, to
truly make this extension we must first find a way to approximate psychological representations
for large numbers of varied naturalistic stimuli.
In parallel to the efforts in psychological modeling, computer scientists have recently seen
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great success on the related task of natural image classification by taking the orthogonal approach
of learning better feature spaces for complex naturalistic stimuli. In particular, convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs) have been shown to achieve human-level accuracy on several benchmark
datasets by learning complex feature representations for naturalistic stimuli as the basis for their
classification14. In this paper, we examine whether stimulus representations from these CNNs are
viable candidates for the approximation of inaccessible human ones, paving the way towards a
wider exploration of human categorization behavior. Although it is unclear whether CNN clas-
sification models resemble human categorization or feature learning, two properties make them
a promising source of representations for modeling human categorization behavior. The first is
that these networks are trained on extremely large datasets of natural images, implying that they
generalize broadly and offer a greater chance of approximating the experience an individual might
have had with a particular class of natural objects. The second is that, given we cannot access
human mental representations directly, these CNN representations have been shown to offer sur-
prisingly good proxies for them in predicting visual cortex brain activity15, 16, and in psychological
experiments investigating similarity judgments, which are closely related to categorization17, 18.
In order to evaluate models of human categorization of natural images using these represen-
tations, we collect and present a novel behavioral dataset, which we call CIFAR10H, that comprises
over 500,000 human categorizations of 10,000 natural images from 10 categories from the “test”
subset of the CIFAR1019 benchmark dataset used in computer vision (see Figures 1 and 2). As
these images have been extensively explored by the machine learning community, they come with
a wealth of corresponding classification models that may be used as the representational basis for
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psychological models.
We find that cognitive models are able to generate good predictions of human categorization
decisions over natural images when using representations from two well-known CNN classifiers,
but not when using standard hand-engineered feature extractors from computer vision or repre-
sentations learned via a leading deep generative (unsupervised) CNN. In addition, when using the
more effective representations, simple parametric prototype models outperform non-parametric
exemplar models—a finding that contrasts with the dominance of exemplar models in laboratory
research on categorization for the last 30 years4, 8, 9, 20. Taken together, our findings suggest that
learning the right feature space might be as fundamental to modeling categorization behavior as
selecting the most suitable categorization model, especially when extending traditional theory to
more naturalistic and complex domains.
Methods
Categorization models It seems intuitive that we categorize a novel stimulus based on its similar-
ity to previously learned categories or memorized examples from them. This motivates a common
framework for existing models: categorization as the assignment of a novel stimulus y to a category
C based on some measure of similarity S(y, t) between feature vector y and those of existing cate-
gory members (expressed in a summary statistic tC = f (x : x ∈C)). This allows us to fully specify
a model by a summary statistic t, a similarity function S, and a function that links similarity scores
for each category to the probability of selecting that category given y.
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The summary statistic t describes the form of the category description that can vary under
different categorization strategies. In a prototype model7, a category prototype—the average of
category members—is used for comparison: tC becomes the central tendency µC of the members
of category C. In an exemplar model9, all memorized category members are used: tC represents
all existing members or “exemplars” of category C and y is compared to all of them.
We take as our similarity function S a standard exponentially-decreasing function of distance
in the stimulus feature space21. We also take S to be an additive function: if t is a vector, S
becomes the summation of the similarities between y and each element of t. Finally, we use the
Luce-Shepard choice rule22, 23 to determine the likelihood of a single categorization, made over 10
categories:
p(Guess “Category i”|y) = S(y, tCi)
γ
S(y, tC1)γ + ... + S(y, tC10)γ
, (1)
where γ is a freely estimated response-scaling parameter.
Building on the common framework for specifying categorization models given above, we
can reduce the probability of each judgment as follows:
p(Guess “Category i”|y) = 1
e
γ log
(
S(y, tC1)
S(y, tCi)
)
+ · · · + eγ log
(
S(y, tC10)
S(y, tCi)
) . (2)
This defines a sigmoid function around the classification boundary, where γ controls its slope, and
therefore degree of determinism. As γ→ ∞, the function becomes deterministic, and as γ→ 0, it
reduces to random responding. When formulated in this manner, the prototype model is equivalent
to a multivariate Gaussian classifier,24 and the exemplar model to a k-nearest-neighbors classifier,
where k = N, and distance weighting is applied.
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To evaluate the predictions of these models against human data, we record the category label,
Ci, that the participant gives to the stimulus yi. We then compute the log-likelihood of the N human
guesses under the model:
L =
N
∑
i=1
log
1
e
γ log
(
S(yi, tC1)
S(yi, tCi)
)
+ · · · + eγ log
(
S(yi, tC10)
S(yi, tCi)
) . (3)
Prototype and exemplar models differ in how their similarity to a category S(y, tC) is calculated,
to which we now turn.
Classic prototype models For prototype models, similarity to a category is taken to be an
exponentially decreasing function of the distance between a stimulus vector y and the category
prototype:
S(y, tC) = e−dC(y) . (4)
A comparison between two categories can be expressed as a simplified ratio:
S(y, tC j)
S(y, tCi)
=
e−dC j(y)
e−dCi(y)
= e−[dC j(y)−dCi(y)] . (5)
Classic prototype models use the (squared) Euclidean distance, SQED(y,C) = (y−µC)T (y−µC),
which gives the following similarity comparison between categories j and i:
S(y, tC j)
S(y, tCi)
= e−[(y−µC j)
T (y−µC j)−(y−µCi)T (y−µCi)] = e−[SQED(y,C j)−SQED(y,Ci)] . (6)
When the prototypes are constructed by averaging the whole set of ground-truth category members,
we call this the “Classic Prototype” model.
Mahalanobis-distance prototype models These “prototype” models can more accurately
be described as “decision-bound” models5, 6, and there is a formal correspondence between such
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models in the psychological literature and a particular subset of multivariate-Gaussian classifiers
from statistics in which the covariance of the Gaussian distribution describing each category is
equal to the identity matrix24. We can then use this correspondence to extend the prototype class to
include several more variants by recognizing that the squared Euclidean distance is a special case
of the Mahalanobis distance metric:
SQED(y,C) = (y−µC)T I (y−µC) (7)
MHD(y,C) = (y−µC)T Σ−1C (y−µC) (8)
where µC and ΣC are the mean—or, prototype—and covariance matrix of category C. We can use
this framework to define linear and quadratic decision-bound prototype models by using different
strategies to estimate the covariance parameters for each ground-truth image category.
If ΣC is the same for all categories, then the decision boundary between competing pro-
totypes in feature space is closest to is a hyperplane, resulting in a linear model24. Taking the
empirical mean of ground-truth category representations as prototype µC, we can define a lin-
ear Mahalanobis-distance model by learning a single diagonal covariance matrix common to all
classes: our “Mahalanobis Prototype (Linear)” model. Here, ΣC is a diagonal matrix, with its
non-zero entries fitted to the diagonal common to all categories—i.e., ΣCi = diag(c), where c is a
vector fitted on training set data across all categories.
If ΣC is allowed to vary across categories, then this classification boundary can take more
complex non-linear forms24. Again taking the empirical mean of ground-truth category repre-
sentations as prototype µC, we can define a quadratic Mahalanobis-distance model by learning
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a diagonal covariance matrix for each category: our “Mahalanobis Prototype (Quadratic)” model.
Here,ΣCi is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal terms ci fitted on training set data for each category
Ci.
Hyperplane prototype models Whereas the above models estimate the category prototype
locations from data and learn the variance terms, we can also define prototype models in which
the variance terms are fixed and the prototype locations learned from data. If we do so, we can
reformulate the classical prototype distance comparison in the following way:
SQED(y,C j) − SQED(y,Ci) = (y−µC j)T (y−µC j) − (y−µCi)T (y−µCi) (9)
= yT y−2µTC jy−µTC jµC j − (yT y−2µTCiy−µTCiµCi) (10)
= vTjiy + d ji , (11)
where v ji = 2(µCi−µC j) defines an ( f −1)-dimensional decision hyperplane orthogonal to the line
connecting the two prototypes centered at its midpoint, and d ji = µTCi µCi− µTC j µC j is a bias term
(representing the differences in sizes of the two prototypes) that can shift this hyperplane along
the line. We call this our “Hyperplane Prototype” model, where we learn the hyperplane normal
vectors, v ji, and bias terms, d ji.
We also evaluated a number of other model variants in which both the prototype locations
and diagonal variance terms were learned from training data. However, as these models performed
no better than the best performing prototype described above for each set of representations, we
omit them going forward.
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Exemplar models In exemplar models, the similarity between y and tC is given by a sum of
the similarities between y and each known category member:
S(y, tC) = ∑
x∈C
e−βd(y,x)
q
, (12)
where q = 2 is a shape parameter, and β is a “specificity” parameter9. The distance between two
vectors is given by the following equation:
d(y,x) =
[
∑
k
wk | xk − yk |r
]1/r
, (13)
where we use r = 2. Weights wi, which are positive and sum to one, are known as “attentional
weights”, and serve to modify the importance of particular dimensions of the input. If these weights
are fixed uniformly in advance—and in combination with the choice of q= 2 above—we obtain an
exemplar model that uses squared Euclidean distance to compare stimulus vectors (our “Exemplar”
model). If instead we allow attention weights to vary, we obtain a more flexible model that uses
the Minkowski distance to compare stimulus vectors (our “Exemplar (Attention)” model).
Stimuli Our image stimuli were taken from the CIFAR10 dataset, which comprises 60,000 32×32-
pixel color images from 10 categories of natural objects19. We collected human judgments for all
10,000 images in the ‘test” subset, which contains 1,000 images for each of the following 10
categories: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, truck (see Figure 1).
Human behavioral data Our CIFAR10H behavioral dataset consists of 511,400 human catego-
rization decisions made over our stimulus set collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk26—to our
knowledge, the largest reported in a single study to date. In our large-scale experiment, partici-
pants were shown upsampled 160×160-pixel images one at a time, and were asked to categorize
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Figure 1: The set of natural images we use in our experiments, organized by the similarity structure
of their associated human categorizations. Images were embedded into two dimensions according
to t-SNE projections of their human classification probabilities across categories25, then mapped
to a 100×100 grid such that adjoining images are nearest neighbors.
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it by clicking one of the 10 labels surrounding the image as quickly and accurately as possible
(Figure 2). Label positions were shuffled between participants. There was an initial training phase,
during which participants had to score at least 75% accuracy, split into 3 blocks of 20 images taken
from the CIFAR10 training set (60 total, 6 per category). If participants failed any practice block
they were asked to redo it until passing the threshold accuracy. After successful practice, each
participant (2,571 total) categorized 200 images (20 from each category) for the main experiment
phase. After every 20 trials, there was an attention check trial using a carefully selected unam-
biguous member of a particular category. Participants who scored below 75% on these checks
were removed from the final analysis (14 participants failed checks). The mean number of judg-
ments per image was 51 (range: 47 − 63). The mean accuracy per participant was 95% (range:
71%− 100%). The mean accuracy per image was 95% (range: 0%− 100%). Average completion
time was 15 minutes, and each participant was paid $1.50.
In Figure 1, we use these category judgments to help visualize our dataset. First, we take
normalized judgments for each image to form a probability distribution over categories. Then,
we use t-SNE projections of these probability vectors to embed the images into two dimensions25.
Finally, we place all images in a 100×100 grid such that adjacent images are nearest neighbors in
the two-dimensional projected space. By doing this, we are able to present our images in such a
way that their global and local similarity structure is preserved according to our behavioral data.
Deep representations Deep CNNs learn a series of translation-invariant feature transformations
of pixel-level input images that are passed to a linear classification layer in order to classify large
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Figure 2: Task paradigm and behavioral data. a. Experiment web interface for our human catego-
rization task. Participants categorized each image from an order-randomized circular array of the
CIFAR10 labels. b. Examples of images and their human choice proportions. For many images
(upper plane and cat), choices are unambiguous, matching the CIFAR10 labels. For others (lower
boat and bird), humans are far less certain.
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sets of natural images14. After training, a network will generate node activations at each layer for
each image, forming vector representations that are increasingly abstract, and can be directly input
into downstream statistical models.
We extract feature representations for each of our stimuli from two popular off-the-shelf
CNNs pre-trained on the training subset of the CIFAR10 dataset, which comprises 5,000 im-
ages from each of the 10 categories listed above. Our first network was a version of AlexNet
for CIFAR1027 that obtains a top-1 classification accuracy of 82% on CIFAR10’s test subset using
Caffe28. We use the representations from its uppermost pooling layer, yielding 1024-dimensional
feature vectors. We use this network because it has a simple architecture that allows for easier ex-
ploration of layers while maintaining classification accuracy in the ballpark of much larger, state-
of-the-art variants. For our second network, we used a DenseNet with 40 layers, 3 dense blocks,
and a growth rate parameter of 12, trained using the keras Python library to a top-1 accuracy of
93%29. We chose this network because it achieves near state-of-the-art performance while still
being parameter efficient (for faster training). The key change DenseNet makes to the fundamental
CNN structure is that each layer passes its output to all layers above (i.e., “dense” connections),
rather than just the subsequent layer, allowing for deeper networks that avoid vanishing gradients30.
We use feature vectors from its uppermost pooling layer, yielding 456-dimensional feature vectors.
We also include two further sets of image representations for comparison. The first are His-
tograms of Oriented Gradients (HOG) for each image31, constructed using the Python opencv
library32. These features are extracted without supervision and supported numerous computer vi-
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Figure 3: Two-dimensional linear-discriminant-analysis projections of the four stimulus represen-
tations we use, for all stimuli (colored by category).
sion tasks prior to modern CNNs. Our most successful HOG representation for which we report
results used a window size of 8× 8 and 324-dimensional feature vectors. The second set of rep-
resentations are 64-dimensional feature vectors from the latent space of a bidirectional generative
adversarial network (BiGAN)33. This network is convolutional, but unsupervised, and allows us to
factor out the contribution of human-derived labels in training CNNs to learn representations useful
for modeling people. Two-dimensional linear-discriminant-analysis plots of these representations
are shown in Figure 3.
Training & Evaluation We optimized all model parameters with 5-fold-cross-validation and
early stopping using the adam variant of stochastic gradient descent34 and a batch size of 256
images. For each model, we conducted a grid search over the learning and decay rate hyperpa-
rameters for adam, selecting the final model parameter set and early-stopping point during training
based on which gave the lowest cross-validated average log-likelihood.
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Model comparison Our primary evaluation measure for each model was log-likelihood. For all
models, we computed these scores by generating predictions for all images in our stimulus set
using the averaged cross-validated parameters taken at the early-stopping point described above.
We also use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare models, as it gives a score for each
model that takes into account the relationship between the number of parameters they employ, and
their log-likelihood scores35
AIC = 2k − 2ln(Lˆ) (14)
where k is the number of parameters in the model, and Lˆ is the maximum log likelihood.
Baselines As baselines, we use the raw output (“softmax”) probabilities of both AlexNet and
DenseNet neural networks for each image to provide S(y, tC). In deep CNN classifiers, the softmax
function takes the inner product between a matrix of learned weights and the rasterized output of
the final pooling layer, and returns a probability distribution over all of the CIFAR10H classes.
These weights are learned based on minimizing classification loss over the training subset of the
CIFAR10 dataset described above. Although not explicitly trained to output human classification
probabilities, these models are the most competitive systems available in terms of making accurate
classifications at the level of human performance. For this reason, and because the models output a
full probability distribution over classes that may exhibit human-like confusion patterns, we expect
them to provide a meaningful and competitive baseline with which to compare our model scores.
16
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Figure 4: Log-likelihood and AIC results for all categorization models using all four stimulus
representations. Within each representation, models are colored and clustered by class (prototype,
exemplar). Baseline model performances are shown using a black bar for relevent feature spaces
(AlexNet and DenseNet). For the HOG representations, the Exemplar (Attention) model failed to
converge and is not shown.
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Results
Categorization model performance for each representation space is shown in Figure 4. One of
the most salient overall outcomes is that the performance of all models is highly dependent on the
underlying stimulus representation. In particular, models making use of hand-engineered computer
vision features (HOG) and those from an unsupervised generative CNN (BiGAN) exhibit poor fit
to human behavior. In contrast, models perform much better when using representations from
simple (AlexNet) and more advanced (DenseNet) supervised CNNs, achieving roughly half the
(negative) log likelihood. This effect does appear to be obviously related to the dimensionality of
stimulus representations: HOG and DenseNet representations are roughly the same dimensionality,
and BiGAN representations comprise the smallest number of features. Nor is it explained by the
use of convolutional architectures alone: BiGAN representations, while able to support effective
generative image modeling and comparable downstream object classification using convolutional
layers in the original work33, perform considerably worse in modeling humans than even the much
older supervised AlexNet CNN. Ultimately, models using the DenseNet representations performed
best of all. This might be expected, given that these representations are from the CNN that scores
highest on natural image ground truth classification. However, it is still interesting to note given
that the DenseNet feature space is much more compressed than AlexNet—with roughly one third
the number of dimensions—yet seems still to allow for more information relevant to the related
task of human categorization to be retained.
As expected, both baseline models performed well. When using AlexNet and DenseNet
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representations, the following three models outperform the AlexNet and DenseNet baselines: the
Hyperplane and Mahalanobis distance models from the linear prototype class and the Mahalanobis
distance model from the quadratic prototype class. The Exemplar model with attention weights
also performs well, roughly similar to baseline. On average the prototype and exemplar models
perform comparably well, and, interestingly, the best-performing model for each set of represen-
tations is from the prototype class. This result is surprising given the frequent superiority in fit by
exemplar models in previous work, and the fact that prototype models only make a single distance
comparison per category, whereas exemplar models make |C|= 1,000 comparisons in our dataset.
With our Hyperplane and Mahalanobis-distance prototype models, we learn the category
prototype and variance, respectively. We find that while using supervised CNN features these
strategies give equivalent results. For the HOG and BiGAN features, learning the prototype loca-
tions (Hyperplane model) appears to improve inference compared to learning category variances.
These better performing prototype models have more free parameters, which allow them greater
freedom to alter CNN representations using human behavioral data during training to learn better
decision bounds. The Classic prototype model with one parameter, on the other hand, performed
less well, and consistently worse than our baselines. This model does not incorporate information
about human behavior to alter the shape of its decision boundary during training, instead estimating
this from the CNN representations alone.
As the log-likelihood improvements for our best-performing models over the one-parameter
Classic prototype model, two-parameter Exemplar model, and CNN baselines are partly a prod-
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uct of increased expressivity, we present AIC scores as an alternate measure of model fit which
penalizes more highly-parameterized models. The only notable change when we do so is that the
Hyperplane, which have parameters for every pair of categories, are penalized such that they per-
form as well as our baselines. This is unsurprising, as the complexity of these models grows with
the square of number of categories, and in this study we have ten.
Discussion
It is testament to the importance of categorization in accounts of cognition that it remains a focus
of research and discovery after so many years of investigation. Continuing this rich tradition, in
the present study we have asked whether we might be able to extend theory matured in simpli-
fied laboratory settings to capture human behavior over stimuli more representative of the complex
visual world we have evolved and learned within. To do so, we take a novel methodological ap-
proach. First, we use a large, diverse collection of natural images as stimuli. Second, we use
state-of-the-art methods from computer vision to estimate the structure of these stimuli, which our
models further adapt based on behavioral training data. This contrasts with the majority of pre-
vious work, in which a small number of a priori-identified features were manipulated to define
and differentiate categories, and as a consequence were limited to simple artificial stimuli. Finally,
we offset the modeling uncertainty these advances introduce by using a large behavioral dataset
to more finely assess graded category membership over stimuli. Taken together, our results show
that using representations derived from CNNs makes it possible to apply psychological models of
categorization to complex naturalistic stimuli, and that the resultant models allow for precise pre-
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dictions about complex human behavior. Our most general finding is that categorization models
that incorporate supervised CNN representations predict human categorizations over natural im-
ages well—in particular, an exemplar model and prototype models that are able to modify CNN
representations using information about human categorizations. This is theoretically interesting
because it indicates there is enough latent information and flexibility in the existing CNN repre-
sentations to harness for such a related task. Moreover, the success of the prototype models in this
context re-motivates these classic cognitive models even after decades or near dormancy.
Working with these complex, naturalistic stimuli reveals a potentially more nuanced view of
human categorization. The broad consensus from decades of laboratory studies using simple arti-
ficial stimuli was that people could learn complex category boundaries of a kind that could only be
captured by an exemplar model8. Extrapolating from these results, we might imagine that catego-
rization should be thought of in terms of learning complex category boundaries in simple feature-
based representations. Our results outline a different perspective. Whereas our exemplar model
performs well, there are clearly some representations—for example, those of the DenseNet—in
which the simple category boundaries defined by prototype models seem sufficient to capture hu-
man behavior. When thinking about humans, feature representations are likely to have been learned
early on, through a slow, data-driven learning process. Given these considerations, one might ex-
pect psychological representations to reflect the natural world, such that categorization of natural
stimuli is made as efficient and as simple as possible. On the other hand, artificial or unlikely
stimuli may at times carve out awkward boundaries in these spaces, which perhaps underlies the
success of exemplar models up to this point. Incorporating feature learning into studies of human
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categorization has been called for in the past36, and developing a deeper understanding of how
these processes interact, especially in the context of complex natural stimuli, is an important next
step towards more fully characterizing human categorization.
We view our approach as complementary to recent work training CNNs to reproduce and
predict the MDS-coordinates of naturalistic images and using these as input for categorization
models37. The key difference is the source of stimulus representations, their generality, and their
cost to procure. MDS-coordinate predictions, if reasonably approximated, capture a great deal of
information about the aspects of stimuli that are psychologically meaningful. However, in order to
train networks to predict them, human similarity judgments between images must be collected—
an expensive task, as the number of pairwise similarity judgments grows quadratically with the
number of images. Additionally, there is little guarantee CNNs trained to predict MDS-solutions
for small sets of images will generalize well to more varied stimulus sets. By contrast, CNNs are
routinely trained to classify thousands and even millions of natural images with high accuracy,
indicating that the information in their representations is somewhat consistent for a wide range of
complex visual stimuli. Using these direct estimations of stimulus structure could be considered a
less precise approximation of human mental representations; however, the already highly relevant
information they encode is easily improved by the simple transformations implicit in almost all
of our top-performing models, which only require a training set of categorization data that grows
linearly with the number of images.
The use and adaptation of machine learning techniques and representations to extend psy-
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chological research into more naturalistic domains is a field in its infancy. However, as we simply
cannot access human psychological representations for such complex naturalistic stimuli, the pre-
liminary success of the approaches above is encouraging, and we are likely to see further benefits
that track the progress of large image databases and improvements in deep network architectures.
More broadly, these results highlight the potential of a new paradigm for psychological research
that draws on the increasingly abundant datasets, machine learning tools, and behavioral data avail-
able online, rather than procuring them for individual experiments at heavy computational and
experimental cost. Towards this aim, the large dataset we offer in this work can provide a direct
bridge between frontline efforts in machine learning and ecologically valid cognitive modeling,
the two of which we hope can continue to develop in synergy.
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